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Abstract
Policy discussions often assume that wider adoption of cyber insurance will promote information security best
practice. However, this depends on the process that applicants need to go through to apply for cyber insurance. A
typical process would require an applicant to fill out a proposal form, which is a self-assessed questionnaire. In this
paper, we examine 24 proposal forms, offered by insurers based in the UK and the US, to determine which security
controls are present in the forms. Our aim is to establish whether the collection of security controls mentioned in the
analysed forms corresponds to the controls defined in ISO/IEC 27002 and the CIS Critical Security Controls; these two
control sets are generally held to be best practice. This work contains a novel research direction as we are the first to
systematically analyse cyber insurance proposal forms. Our contributions include evidence regarding the assumption
that the insurance industry will promote security best practice. To address the problem of adverse selection, we
suggest the number of controls that proposal forms should include to be in alignment with the two information
security frameworks. Finally, we discuss the incentives that could lead to this disparity between insurance practice and
information security best practice, emphasising the importance of information security economics in studying cyber
insurance.
Keywords: Business security, Security controls, Cyber insurance, SANS20 controls, ISO/IEC 27000 series
1 Introduction
Insurers are taking on liability for ever more cyber risk;
a 2015 report revealed that cyber insurance gross writ-
ten premiums now stand at over $2 billion [1]. The
same report reveals that demand for cyber insurance is
expected to double by 2020. This is unsurprising given
that company boards are beginning to better understand
the nature of the risks that they face and realise the exis-
tence of gaps in traditional insurance coverage, as can
been seen in a 2015 Cyber Risk Survey Report commis-
sioned by Marsh [2]. For example, a 2015 study of 350
companies from 11 countries revealed the average cost of
a data breach is $3.8 million [3]. While data breaches take
the headlines, there are a multitude of other risks rang-
ing from cyber extortion to unintended virus propagation,
many of which can be covered by a range of new cyber
insurance policies [4].
Despite soaring demand, underwriters are struggling
to understand each consumer’s cyber risk profile; a 2015
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Cyber Liability Insurance Market Trend report showed
the number one barrier to selling cyber policies is ‘not
understanding exposures’ [1]. Getting this process wrong
can be very costly. Target™ were reimbursed $90 million
by their insurer following their 2013 data breach [5].
Traditional insurance techniques involve creating actu-
arial tables of loss histories across defined risk profiles.
These are inapplicable for two reasons, the first being
that insurers do not know the properties and attributes
which delimit different risk profiles, while the second is
that insurers do not have the loss history data to create
the actuarial tables. In fact, relevant loss historymay never
exist given the dynamic nature of cyber risk. At present,
all that insurers can rely on to quantify cyber risk is the
information they collect in the assessment process. How-
ever, the evidence regarding the presence or not of specific
security controls that insurers require in these assessment
processes may have further consequences.
It is suggested that security decisions driven by insur-
ers inform policy discussions in the US [6], the UK [7] and
the EU [8]. Implicit in these discussions is the assump-
tion that the insurance industry can have a meaningful
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and positive impact on the management of cyber security.
One argument in support of the assumption is that insur-
ers have been successfully dealing in risk for hundreds of
years. A more fine-grained view of the insurance industry
reveals that there have been examples of insurers making
systemic oversights. For example, the solicitors’ profes-
sional indemnity market saw prominent insurers ‘move
away from the bottom of the market’ during the 2010
crisis as the Irish insurer Quinn fell into administration
[9]. With this in mind, the assumption that cyber insur-
ance will have a positive impact on security posture of
organisations requires further investigation.
The aim of this paper is to explore how well the current
cyber insurance assessment process aligns with estab-
lished network security best practice, as provided by
the International Organization for Standardization and
the International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC)
27002 and the Center for Internet Security (CIS) Critical
Security Controls Version 6.0. Our approach investigates
insurance proposal forms, a self-assessed questionnaire
that applicants are expected to complete as an initial part
of the cyber insurance application process. The key value
of the results of our study is that they allow us to high-
light neglected aspects of the assessment process. This can
inform policy-makers by providing empirical evidence as
to the success of cyber insurance in promoting estab-
lished risk management standards. Further, it can help
cyber insurers refine the assessment process grounded in
security best practice.
Our paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we
outline how the insurance industry has developed, the
coverage offered presently and the industry’s method
of assessment. Section 3 reviews related work on cyber
insurance from a range of disciplines. Section 4 details
our methodology, which focuses on one aspect of the
assessment process and analysing self-assessed proposal
forms. In Section 5, we compare the security controls
that the insurance application process focuses on with
the controls in the CIS Critical Security Controls and
ISO 27002 frameworks. Section 6 provides a discussion
of these results, and centres around lessons to be learned.
Section 7 concludes with a discussion of how the assess-
ment process will have to adapt to a changing market;
particularly how an increase in demand from smaller busi-
nesses could lead to a greater reliance on the self-assessed
forms analysed in this paper.
2 Cyber insurance industry
The first standalone Internet-based insurance policies
were the hacker insurance policies of the late 1990s, in
which an insurer partnered with a technology company to
offer a policy covering the insured firm’s first party loss
[10]. As firms outside the technology industry became
increasingly dependent on their networks, it became clear
that the coverage which traditional policies offered left
significant gaps. For example, most business insurance
policies used to cover tangible property often exclude lia-
bility relating to electronic data loss [11]. In response
to this, insurance companies started to offer standalone
cyber insurance policies. These policies are broken down
into a number of sub-policies, with coverage offered for
a specific set of risks. For example, First-Party Coverage
covers the ‘the cost of replacing or restoring lost data’.
Table 1 includes the most common coverage and the risks
that it provides liability for, it was chosen on the basis of
studies of insurance policies [10, 12, 13]. The range of cov-
erage found in Table 1 will form an extensional definition
for cyber insurance.
The current market for standalone cyber insurance con-
sists of insurers offering coverage to large companies. In
the US, we find that 26% of companies with a revenue of
$5 billion or more have cyber insurance, in stark contrast
to less than 3% of those who return less than $500k [14].
In the UK, a 2015 report revealed that 2% of large com-
panies use standalone cyber insurance while cyber insur-
ance penetration is ‘negligible’ for smaller firms [15]. The
demand for cyber insurance among smaller may increase.
Smaller firms see a ‘higher incidence of Cyber Crime’ and
the three biggest risks that smaller firms face are business
interruption, privacy events and fraud [15]. Further, the
current cyber insurance coverage offered, as detailed in
Table 1, covers these risks.
There is a danger that a firm may apply for cyber
insurance in the knowledge that they have little security
infrastructure in place. This is the problem of adverse
selection — which occurs when a more informed party
engages in strategic behaviour at the expense of another
party they are in contract with. Insurers address this issue
Table 1 Showing the range of coverage available
Coverage What it covers
First-party coverage Coverage for the cost of replacing or
restoring lost data. Excludes
intellectual property.
Data privacy and network Coverage for liability claims of a third party
like a data breach or
Security Liability Unintentional transmission of a computer
Business interruption Covers revenues lost as a result of network
down time.
Cyber-extortion Cover for investigation costs, sometimes the
extortion demand.
Public relations Fees for Public Relations firm to manage
reputation in the event of a breach.
Multi-media liability Costs relating to the content of a firm’s
website like copyright infringement.
Professional services Liability relating to a service offer such as
web hosting or internet service.
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via extensive ex-ante assessment, which involves collect-
ing information on an applicant, in order for an under-
writer to classify the applicant into a given risk category
and then set the insurance premium [16]. Much of this
information is collected in a questionnaire filled out by
an applicant, known as a proposal form. Table 2 contains
a selection of the information that these forms seek to
collect, along with the questions asked. For example, the
insurer seeks information relating to the type of data col-
lected by the applicant, via the question ‘Do you store,
process and/or transmit any Sensitive Data on Your Com-
puter System (Tick all that apply)’. These were selected to
give the reader an insight into the questions asked, a full
picture can be found by investigating the forms presented
in Table 3.
It is common practice to supplement this form with fur-
ther assessment such as on-site audit and/or interviews
with senior technology (IT) staff [17]. This supplementary
assessment focuses on network security design and imple-
mentation, alongside organisational culture [16]. The aim
of our paper is to assess the questions relating to the
Table 2 The type of information collected and questions asked
in the ex-ante assessment
Information collected Question in the form
Revenue Gross Annual Revenue Last Year £
Type of Data Collected Do you store, process and/or transmit any
Sensitive Data
on Your Computer System (Tick all that
apply):
Credit card info Customer info
Money/Securities info
Healthcare info Trade secrets IP Assets
Volume of data collected Approximately howmany private individuals
do you hold sensitive data on:
Loss History In the past 5 years has the company ever
experienced
any of the following events or incidents?:
Sustained an unscheduled network outage
that lasted over 24 hours Yes No
Portable media that was lost or stolen and
was not encrypted Yes No
Out Sourcing/Suppliers Current Network and Technology Providers
(if applicable):
Internet Communication Services Please
Provide Information on.
Credit Card Processor(s) Please Provide
Information on.
Website Hosting Please Provide Information
on.
Anti-virus Software Please Provide Information
on.
Managed Security Services Please Provide
Information on.
applicant’s security controls in the self-assessed proposal
forms. Our analysis will not consider more general infor-
mation such as the applicant’s financial situation, type of
data collected or previous loss history. We believe that
the self-assessed forms provide a scalable assessment pro-
cess that could help meet increased demand from smaller
businesses.
3 Related work
Cyber insurance has been part of academic discussion
since Dan Geer first advocated for risk management tech-
niques [18]. Bruce Schneier outlined his vision of cyber
insurance detailing how security decisions are driven by
an insurer’s checklist and the corresponding insurance
premium [19]. The benefits of such an approach have
become consensus in the literature and it appears increas-
ingly representative of the reality of industry. We draw a
distinction between two bodies of academic work; the first
tends to focus on the insurancemarket at large, the second
is a multidisciplinary look at individual cyber insurance
policies.
The first is a stream of literature of the field of Secu-
rity Economics, which was founded upon the realisation
that misplaced incentives play a part in explaining why
many security systems fail [20]. In this vein, various works
conclude that insurers offering reduced premiums pro-
vides incentives for security investment, which corrobo-
rates Schneier’s early predictions [17, 21, 22]. There have
been many attempts to model different aspects of the
insurance market. A unifying framework is provided by
Böhme et al. [23], which draws a distinction between two
aspects of the market. First of all, the focus on how secu-
rity investments accrue benefits to all parties in a system,
not just the investor— particularly, how these positive
externalities can reduce the risk an insurer faces [24–27].
Secondly, there have been various considerations of sys-
temic risk, in which many firms make claims arising
from the same event because of the interdependency of
networks [28–30].
In addition, information asymmetries are considered in
the context of principal-agent problems. Moral hazard, in
which an agent engage in riskier behaviour because they
know a principal protects them from the consequences, is
explored by Shetty et al. [31]. Bandyopadhyay et al. con-
sider the situation where the insured chooses not to report
an incident because the amount of indemnity received
is smaller than the costs relating to reputation damage
[32]. The problem of adverse selection, which we dis-
cussed earlier, is examined in the literature. For example,
if a firm knows they are relatively exposed to cyber risk
they are more likely to seek cyber insurance [33]. It is sug-
gested that this will lead to expensive premiums across the
market [34]. Our work directly addresses the problem of
adverse selection by analysing the information collected
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Table 3 Forms included in our study and the insurer offering them
ACE Insured [43] CFC Underwriting [56] Philadelphia Insurance Companies [57]
ACE Privacy Protection [58] CFC Underwriting [59] PInsure [60]
ACE Privacy Protection [61] Great American Insurance Group [42] Risk placement Services [62]
AIG [40] Hiscox [41] Sutcliffe & Co Insurance Consultants [63]
Ascent Underwriting [64] Lockton Companies [65] Sybaris [66]
Beazley [67] Markel International [68] The Compass Group [69]
Business Insurance 24/7 [70] Naturesave Insurance [71] The Hartford [72]
CFC Underwriting [73] OneBeacon Insurance [74] TravelersJ [75]
that insurers use to determine the applicant’s exposure to
cyber risk.
The second body of work focuses on investigating cyber
insurance policies. Parts of insurance literature provide
an analysis of the insurability of cyber risks using the
KARTEN framework [35] and the Berliner insurability
framework [36]. This analysis reveals that ‘Randomness of
loss occurrence’ and ‘Information asymmetry’ are prob-
lematic aspects of cyber insurance. As ‘Information asym-
metry’ relates to adverse selection and moral hazard, this
supports the results of the first body of literature. In
addition, this stream of literature considers gaps in tradi-
tional policies [37]. Legal scholarship reflects on the issue
of tangible property and data [11] and whether liability
covers international cyber torts [38]. Business literature
investigates the role of insurance within a risk manage-
ment strategy [39], how insurers deal with moral hazard
[16] and the type of coverage available [4]. There is fur-
ther work analysing cyber insurance policies to under-
stand coverage offered. Six policies are examined by Baer
et al. [12], 14 are analysed by Marotta et al. [13] and
Majuca et al. [10] focus on 7 different policies offered
by AIG. We used these analyses of coverage to form our
definition of cyber insurance.
We believe there is much to be gained from pooling
the knowledge of these two bodies of work. The broad
explanatory power of the Security Economics work can
inform the empirical research undertaken in much of the
second body of literature. Equally this second body can
provide the empirical data to help refine the theory in
the Security Economics literature. Our paper fits into the
second body of work because we focus on the business
processes of a cyber insurer. More specifically, we aim to
analyse the effectiveness of the insurer’s assessment, with
a view to mitigating the adverse selection problem. We do
this through the analysis of 24 different proposal forms.
To our knowledge, this is the first time any such proposal
forms have been systematically analysed in such a volume.
4 Methodology
In this paper we analyse 24 cyber insurance proposal
forms, each corresponding to a different cyber insurance
policy offered by a UK or a US insurance firm. These
forms were chosen because they were publicly available,
which provides an opportunity to investigate the initial
part of the assessment process. The subsequent stages
which involve processing and analysing the forms, as well
as further assessment via on-site audit or telephone inter-
view, require privileged access to much of what insurers
consider intellectual property.
The proposal forms were all created between 2008 and
2016, with 20 of our forms being created in the last four
years. Some examples of the forms considered include
those from AIG [40], Hiscox [41], Great American Insur-
ance Group [42], ACE Insured [43] and CFC Underwrit-
ing [44] and the full spectrum can be found in Table 3.
These organisations fall into two categories; underwrit-
ers and brokers. An underwriter decides whether to offer
the client a policy, receives the premium and takes on the
responsibility of paying the insured’s claims. A broker will
represent one or more underwriters by brokering the deal
between the insurer and the insured. The analysed forms
are offered by a mixture of underwriters and brokers and
consisted of 14 underwriters offering 16 policies and 8
brokers offering 8 policies.
The sample of proposal forms was collected by search-
ing publicly indexed web page results. This search looked
for variations upon, and not limited to, ‘cyber security
insurance proposal form’. These forms were collected
using new search terms or more results for the same
search term. The search ended when either of these
stopped revealing new proposal forms. Forms not offered
by a UK or US company, or forms that were offered out-
side the UK and US, were considered out of scope. Our
rational being that these two countries are leading the
cyber insurancemarket globaly [14, 15].Many of the inter-
national forms were adaptations of the parent company’s
forms offered in the US or the UK. The forms were anal-
ysed using the ISO/IEC 27002 (ISO) and CIS Critical
Security Controls frameworks.
The proposal forms were investigated using a form of
content analysis known as deductive thematic analysis
[45]. We selected a qualitative content analysis in order
to build a conceptual model to describe the process of
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assessment in the insurance application process. This was
chosen over a quantitative approach because we are try-
ing to infer from the questions what information the
forms seek to collect; a qualitative analysis can better cap-
ture these “meanings and intentions” [45]. While some
have described content analysis as a “counting game” [46],
others have identified its ability to “identify critical pro-
cesses” [47]. A deductive approach was chosen because
the themes, which are perceived as concepts by which
models are structured, are provided by existing knowl-
edge, avoiding issues related to their creation with other
approaches [45].
ISO/IEC 27002 is an internationally recognised secu-
rity management scheme [48]. It contains 19 sections,
of which we focus on sections 6 to 18 as these contain
actionable security controls. ISO/IEC 27002 was chosen
over other standards in the 27000 series as it prescribes
detailed controls, which are not applicable to a particular
organization. This allows us to consider proposal forms
without worrying about the specific organisations that
they are intended for. The Center for Internet Security
(CIS), led the development of the CIS Critical Security
Controls (CSC). This involved a process of engagement
with individuals, from a range of sectors and a range of
roles, to ensure they are a ‘prioritized, highly focused set of
actions’ [49]. We chose the CIS’ CSC 20 Controls because
they provide a more detailed perspective, as compared to
ISO 27002, but can also be essential at identifying infras-
tructure vulnerability [50]. The version of CSC 20 that we
used was version 6.0.
Both frameworks consist of broad controls with a num-
ber of sub-controls containing more detailed guidance.
The content of the proposal forms will be referred to as
questions in the rest of the paper. Our approach was to
count for each sub-control the number of forms request-
ing information about that sub-control. The process of
classifying units of analysis under themes is “one of the
most challenging aspects of the study” and “may be diffi-
cult to put into words” [45].
We illustrate this process bymeans of an example. In the
CFC Underwriting’s Esurance C&P proposal form [44],
question 3.6 is ‘Have your systems been subject to a third
party security audit?’ Considering the ISO framework, this
question corresponds to sub-control ‘18.2: Information
Security Reviews’. A similar rationale was applied through-
out our analysis. This allowed a comparison between the
information collected and the established best practice
relating to network security.
A degree of subjectivity is inevitable; a handful of ques-
tions corresponded loosely to a sub-control and a judge-
ment was made. For example, both the CSC sub-controls
5.7 and 16.2 mention passwords ‘longer than 14 charac-
ters’, which did not correspond to the question ‘Does the
company enforce passwords that are at least seven char-
acter...?’ asked in ACE’s Privacy Protection policy [43].
This method favoured controls phrased more generically
because a higher degree of specificity means a given ques-
tion is less likely to correspond to the control. This was
done to maintain consistency throughout our analysis.
5 Results
In order to reason about the results of our qualittive
analysis of the assessments, we devised two simple met-
rics. The first numbers the times that every sub-controls
was refered to in all 24 assessment forms. This metric
allows us to identify the most popular controls as well as
those neglected by insurers. The second indicates the per-
centage of sub-controls referred in the forms for every
control. The rationale being that in order for a security
control to be effective the majority of the sub-controls
are required to be in place. Therfore, a low percentage
would indicate that the controls is not properly addressed.
Figures 1 and 2 show the total number of sub-controls
addressed per control for each of ISO/IEC 27002 and the
Fig. 1 Showing the total number of sub-controls with a question in a form corresponding to that sub-control
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Fig. 2 Showing the total number of sub-controls mentioned in the forms per control
CIS CSC. This presents an overview of how the forms
align with each of the frameworks. This is complemented
by a more in-depth look at a select few controls. Due
to space economy, we choose the three most and least
addressed controls, exploring which specific sub-controls
were and were not mentioned. Tables 4 and 5 detail the
average percentage of sub-controls addressed per con-
trol, providing an insight into which sub-controls were
not addressed.
5.1 ISO 27001
In this section, our analysis follows ISO/IEC 27002:2013.
Figure 1 presents the number of sub-controls that were
addressed by a given form and we then aggregate
this information for all the forms and each control.
The number of sub-controls in each section increases the
maximum possible score. We note that every ISO con-
trol was addressed by at least one form. The three highest
scoring controls were Sections 8, 12 and 18 which relate to
asset management, operational security and compliance
respectively.
The sub-controls which were mentioned most often
were 10.1 Cryptographic controls, 12.2 Protection from
malware, 18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual
requirements and 12.3 Backupwith scores of 18, 23, 22 and
19 respectively. These scores correspond to the number of
forms that ask about the sub-control. For example, 23 of
the forms asked for information relating to the applicant’s
protection from malware.
Only two forms did not address a sub-control related to
18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual requirements,
which involves managing obligations to external authori-
ties such as regulation regimes. Table 6 contains a number
of these regulatory frameworks, along with the number
of forms that it was mentioned in. Regulatory framework
is used as an umbrella term to describe government reg-
ulation, compliance standards and security approaches.
Table 4 Percentage of sub-controls addressed per CSC control
Control %
CSC 1: Inventory Authorized Devices and Unautorized Devices 0
CSC 2: Inventory Authorized Devices and Unautorized Software 0
CSC 3 : Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on
Mobile
0.58
Devices, Laptops, Workstations, and Servers
CSC 4: Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation 8.33
CSC 5: Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges 0
CSC 6: Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs 2.79
CSC 7: Email and Web Browser Protections 0
CSC 8: Malware Defenses 26.38
CSC 9: Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and
Services
5.54
CSC 10: Data Recovery Capability 29.17




CSC 12: Boundary Defense 9.17
CSC 13: Data Protection 4.11
CSC 14: Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know 17.13
CSC 15: Wireless Access Control 2.33
CSC 16: Account Monitoring and Control 5.04
CSC 17: Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to
Fill Gaps
10
CSC 18: Application Software Security Incident Response and
Management
4.58
CSC 19: Incident Response and Management 6.54
CSC 20: Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises 3.67
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Table 5 Percentage of sub-controls addressed per control
ISO control Percentage
Section 6: Organization of information security 37.50%
Section 7: Human resource security 34.70%
Section 8: Asset management 42.70%
Section 9: Access control 28.10%
Section 10: Cryptography 75%
Section 11: Physical and environmental security 35.40%
Section 12: Operations management 38.70%
Section 13 Communications security 14.60%
Section 14: System acquisition, development 6.90%
and maintenance
Section 15: Supplier relationships 29.20%
Section 16: Info security incident management 16.70%
Section 17: Business continuity management 50%
Section 18: Compliance 68.80%
ISO 27001 and UK Cyber Essentials are included as they
tended to be mentioned in the same section as formal
regulation like HIPAA or GLBA.
Figure 1 demonstrates that the controls with the lowest
scores were Section 13: Communications security, Section
14: System acquisition, development and maintenance and
Section 16: Information security incident management.
Section 13 contains two sub-controls, the first relates to
secure networks and the second secure communication
with third parties. The first was occasionally addressed
through network segregation, which is mentioned in
the sub-control. The second is addressed through non-
disclosure agreements.
Section 14 relates to the development and procurement
of products, particularly relating to security requirements.
None of the forms addressed security requirements,
though two US firms mentioned the use of open source
code in development, which is relevant to the develop-
ment process. Finally three forms asked about test pro-
cedures. Section 16 relates to incident response, which is
mentioned in only eight forms; none of these forms men-
tion insider threat. Since there is only one sub-control,
however, this results in a relatively high score in Table 5.
Table 6 Compliance, regulation and standards
Regulatory approach Questions
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) 17
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 11
Gramm Leach Bliley Act (GLBA) 8
ISO 27001 7
UK Data Protection Act 5
UK Cyber Essentials 1
Table 5 shows, for each ISO control, the average percent-
age of sub-controls with at least one question relating to
that sub-control in each form per control.
Only four sub-controls had no corresponding ques-
tions in any of the analysed forms. In ISO, 12.1 looks
at controlling and documenting changes to operating
responsibilities and procedures, 12.5 relates to control-
ling the installation of software, 12.7 looks at minimising
the adverse effects of IT audits and 14.1 to specify secu-
rity control requirements. All of these scored zero. Only
one form contained a question relating to 14.2, which
looks at software/systems development processes. Only
two forms contained questions corresponding to each of
13.2, about policies and agreements regarding communi-
cations with third parties, and 9.3, which relates to user’s
responsibilities including choosing strong passwords.
A low score in Table 5 suggests that many of the sub-
controls have not been addressed, which suggests there
is relevant information that has not been collected. It is
unsurprising that Control 10, which relates to cryptog-
raphy, scores well because there is only one sub-control
and most of the forms mention cryptographic proto-
cols. Similarly, Section 18 scores highly; this is because
the first control relates to compliance and the second to
external security audits, each of these sub-controls is well-
represented in the proposal forms. This analysis reveals
Control 12: Operations Management has much room for
improvement, despite the sub-controls relating to mal-
ware control, backups and patching scoring highly. Con-
trol 12 contains some sub-controls which were entirely
ignored such as 12.5 Control of operational software and
14.1 Security requirements of information systems.
5.2 CIS Top 20 security controls
In this section we detail our analysis of the forms based
on the CIS Top 20 Critical Security Controls (CSC).
Figure 2 uses the same methodology as Fig. 1, the dif-
ference being that the controls are provided by the CSC.
Controls which have scored highly include: CSC8: Mal-
ware Defenses, CSC10: Data Recovery Capability, CSC 13:
Data Protection and CSC 14: Controlled Access Based on
the Need to Know. On the other hand, we note that CSC1:
Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices, CSC2:
Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software, CSC
5: Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges and CSC 7:
Email andWeb Browser Protections had no corresponding
questions in the proposal forms.
More specifically, CSC8: Malware Defenses scored high-
est in this analysis. Table 7 details the sub-controls of
CSC8: Malware Defenses and the number of forms that
ask a question relating to each sub-control. Table 7 reveals
that 8.1 was the main factor for this high score, which
asks for anti-virus and personal firewalls on all work
stations. Control 8.2 was consistently mentioned in the
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Table 7 Sub-controls for the malware defenses control
CSC 8: malware defenses Questions
8.1 Automated tools to continuously monitor workstations 23
8.2 Employ software to automatically push regular AV
updates
13
8.3 Limit use of removable devices outside approved busi-
ness need
0
8.4 Enable anti-exploitation features 0
8.5 Identify executables in network traffic 0
8.6 Enables DNS query logging 0
forms; this sub-control relates to installing system updates
to machines. However, the other six sub-controls were
left completely unaddressed. For example, 8.4 relates to
malware and removable media. Only two forms mention
removable media outside of the context of encryption,
both of which relate to downloading sensitive informa-
tion, not malware defences. Similarly none of the forms
mention searching for executables in network traffic, anti-
exploitation features or DNS query logging.
CSC10: Data Recovery Capability consists of four sub-
controls and we detail our analysis of this control in
Table 8. Note that only one sub-control was not men-
tioned in the forms, compared to six in CSC8: Malware
Defenses. Control 12.4 aims to ensure key systems have a
back-up, which is not ‘continuously addressable through
operating system calls’. While some forms do ask if the
back-up is housed off-site, this question does not fully
comply with the sub-control, since a cloud provider could
be housed off-site but still being continuously addressable
through operating system calls.
Many controls had very low scores, such as CSC17,
which relates to staff awareness and training. Only eight
forms asked about delivering security training and two
forms asked about periodic testing. The first two in terms
of priority CSC controls relate to keeping an inventory of
authorised software and hardware; yet none of the forms
contain any of the followings words: inventory, authorised,
unauthorised, blacklist or whitelist. One UK firm asks
for ‘approximate number of devices on network’; while
this necessitates some form of crude inventory, it does
not sufficiently address any of the sub-controls in CSC1:
Table 8 Sub-controls for the Data Recovery control
CSC10: data recovery Questions
10.1 Each system is automatically backed every week 14
10.2 Perform test data restoration process regularly 5
10.3 Backups protected via physical security or
encryption where stored
9
10.4 Key systems have a backup not continuously 0
addressable via operating system calls
Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices. We
will discuss whether keeping an inventory is implicit in
other controls in Section 6.
Operating systems (OS) and applications were par-
ticularly under-addressed despite controls such as
CSC 18: Application Software Security. Only three
forms mentioned ‘software’ in a capacity beyond secu-
rity software (such as AV or firewall) or patching.
Two of these related to providing software to other firms
— one of these related to supplying software using open
source software. None of the following recommendations
of CSC2: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Soft-
ware were mentioned: monitoring software installed on
machines, software version installed or air-gapping high
risk applications.
Further, only three forms mentioned operating systems;
these related to standard configuration, the type of oper-
ating system (OS) in use and whether the OS continued
to be supported by the manufacturer. The first falls under
CSC3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software
and was the only form to correspond to a sub-control
under this control. CSC 5 outlines The processes and tools
used to track, control, prevent, correct the use, assignment,
and configuration of administrative privileges on comput-
ers, networks, and applications. Yet we found that only one
of the formmentions administrative privileges, which was
in connection with social media accounts.
CSC 7: Email and Web Browser Protections was a new
addition to version 6.0 of the CSC; its sub-controls involve
disabling unnecessary plugins, add-ons and scripting lan-
guages in all web browsers and clients, logging URL
requests, maintaining network based URL filters, scan-
ning and blocking email attachments with malicious code,
among others. There are eight sub-controls comprising
this control and none of the forms analysed contained a
question corresponding to any of them.
As with the ISO analysis, Table 4 includes the aver-
age percentage of sub-controls addressed per control. The
only factor affecting the scores relative to in Fig. 2 is
the number of subcontrols, which range from 4 to 12.
CSC10: Data Recovery Capability and CSC 17: Security
Skills Assessment had very few sub-controls, consequently
they score higher. While CSC 12: Boundary Defense, CSC
13: Data Protection and CSC 16: Account Monitoring and
Control had many sub-controls, thus a lower score was
asigned.
6 Discussion
Policy makers, organisations seeking insurance and insur-
ers have different priorities and will interpret these results
accordingly. Organisations can prioritise the controls in
place before applying for insurance, policy makers may
gain an insight into the extent to which insurance pro-
motes security best practice, and insurers can address
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areas of cyber security they neglect to collect informa-
tion about. We will discuss the specific lessons learnt in
this section.
6.1 Organisations seeking insurance
The results presented in this paper provide organisations
in the US and the UK that consider to apply for cyber
insurance with a view of the minimum security controls
that will be sought. While we do not know how the infor-
mation collected translates to premium pricing, it is rea-
sonable to assume that the controls mentioned will lead
to a reduction. Further, implementing information secu-
rity management schemes, such as ISO/IEC 27000 and
the CSC, can be a challenge. This is particularly true for
organisations operating under resource constraints, such
as small and medium sized enterprises. Organisations
must prioritise which controls to implement first, if at all.
We suggest that the insurance industry could be used to
help organisations prioritise which controls to implement.
Insurers’ exposure to multiple organisations with similar
functionalities gives them a greater understanding of the
risks that they hold. Consequently, insurers have a greater
awareness of the financial losses that are occurring as a
result of cyber attack and which controls are important to
mitigate this loss.
With that in mind, the results suggest that crypto-
graphic controls, malware protection, compliance with
legal requirements and maintaining an effective back up,
should be prioritised first, since these are the most com-
monly asked by insurers. This is in contrast to the CIS
guidance that states “Controls CSC1 through CSC5 are
essential to success and should be considered among the
very first things to be done” [49]; these include keep-
ing an inventory of devices and software, ensuring secure
configurations on all devices, continuous vulnerability
management and controlling administrative privileges.
This is a worrying discrepancy. One cause could be the
difference in scope; the CSC are a set of “security actions”
[49] and are restricted accordingly, meanwhile an insurer
has no such restriction. This difference between organ-
isational controls and security controls can account for
some of the disparity. Measures such as the existence of
a Chief Information Officer, maintaining a business con-
tinuity plan or being certified PCI compliant are not in
the scope of the CSC. However, it does not explain why
cryptographic controls andmalware protection, which are
covered in CSC8: Malware Defenses and CSC10: Data
Recovery Capability, are mentioned so often, while the
Critical Security Controls with a higher priority are not
mentioned at all.
One possible explanation is that insurers consider these
controls more effective at mitigating the risk they are
liable for. It is important to remember that gaps in cov-
erage mean that insurers have different incentives when
assessing the effectiveness of controls. Another consid-
eration is that compliance with legal requirements may
address certain controls, so the forms need not. Addition-
ally, insurersmay seekmore specific technical information
in the interview process. Finally, the CSC are updated
annually and some forms in our study were created before
2010. However, 20 of the forms were created in the last
four years and although the CSC are updated, many of the
controls remain constant throughout.
Refelcting on the recent incidents, the presence of
the afforementioned controls might have mitigated the
impact of the Wannacry attack in the NHS, where more
than 40 hospital have been affected [51]. In these attacks,
hackers used a well-known exloit to infect systems before
encrypting all data and rendering them unavailable until
a ransom is paid. As a consequence, many hospitals
reverted to using paper and IT systems were discharged
[52]. The presence of a back-up system as well as a mal-
ware defense system would have mitigated the impact
of the attack and might have prevented the incident for
happening. However, these controls mainly focus on mit-
igating the risk insurers are liable for and still allow room
for the attack to take place.
6.2 Informing the insurance assessment process
Our results provide two distinct evaluations that can be
used to improve the insurance process and address the
problem of adverse selection. The first revolves around the
results presented in Figs. 1 and 2 that present the abso-
lute number of sub-controls mentioned in the forms. The
second focuses on the analysis provided in Tables 4 and
5 which explains what additional information is required
to adequately represent the specific control into ques-
tion. Regarding the first evaluation, it gives an overview
of which controls are in the proposal forms and which
controls have been overlooked. This analysis suggests
systems development and acquisition, communications
management and incident management deemed of the
highest priority.
However, this presentation of results may not be appro-
priate for all purposes. Figure 1 suggests that ISO: Section
12 is well addressed. Yet Table 5 shows that there is a
majority of sub-controls which are not accounted for. The
first presentation may be appropriate for insurers with
a relatively low maturity of assessment, where any addi-
tional information would help the underwriting process.
Meanwhile, the second presentation of results is useful for
high-maturity assessment seeking to collect information
relating to all critical controls.
The results show that the information gathered by the
forms ismore aligned with the ISO/IEC 27002 framework.
This is understandable given that the CSC relate to net-
work security and many controls may be too detailed for
the assessment process. In spite of this, there is still much
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we can learn from the CSC because appropriate network
security is vital to mitigating many of the risks that cyber
insurance covers. For example, the authors of the CSC
deem CSC5: Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges to
be of high priority. As a result, it was moved from being
CSC12 in Version 5.0 to CSC5 in Version 6.0 of the CSC
[49]. Yet none of the forms directly address any of the sub-
controls pertaining to CSC5. Similarly, CSC 7: Email and
Web Browser Protections relates to application security.
However, none of the forms address the corresponding
sub-controls, which is worrying given that applications are
increasingly being considered as a “prime [attack] vector
into an organisation” [53].
Addressing the lack of questions referring to CSC1 and
CSC2 could provide valuable benefits for the insurer. An
inventory of hardware and software could help the under-
writing process by putting a value on the assets at risk.
Further, it will help with forensic investigation and sup-
port other goals such as revoking access to devices once an
employee has departed from the organisation. Here, our
discussion touches upon the interdependence of security
controls. One consideration is that the interdependence of
controls mean that some controls are implicitly addressed.
For example, some of the proposal forms ask for secu-
rity software ’on all desktops, laptops and servers’. It could
be argued that this necessitates an inventory of hardware,
meaning there is no need to ask about CSC1.
Assessing the existence of controls alone provides a
’check-box compliance’ view of network security. This
has been raised as one criticism of regulation [54]. If
the insurance industry is to evolve towards accurate risk
assessment it must take a holistic and responsive view of
risk management. We suggest that a wider coverage of
the CSC sub-controls can provide provide guidance on
how to manage the implementation of a control, rather
than merely check of its existence. For example, many
of the questions merely ask whether the firm is ‘con-
ducting regular penetration tests’. More alignment with
the specific advice contained within CSC20: Penetration
Tests and Red Team Exercises could provide a clearer view
of the implementation of this control and help insurers
better understand an applicant’s network security prac-
tices. However, it is important to be aware of the tension
between the need formore information and the ease of the
application process, which is the second largest obstacle
to selling cyber insurance according to a 2015 survey [1].
Reflecting on the afforementioned incident that crip-
pled NHS services, it is evident that the controls offered
by CIS would have not only mitigated the problem but
might have prevented it from occurring in the first
place. An inventory of hardware and software is a criti-
cal step in any business continuity plan and in the case
of NHS systems were shout down because there was no
clear indication of the software they were using [55].
Additioanlly, Microsoft had provided a patch for the
exploit, however, most hospitals used obsolete operation
systems and did not update their sytems due to the “com-
plexity of keeping systems up to date” [55]. Having had
inventories and system updates, three of the most impor-
tant CIS controls, these atatcks may have been avoided.
It is clear that there is an overlap but a small discrepancy
as well between the controls suggested by best practice
frameworks and those requested by the insurance com-
munity. Therefore, there should be further discussions
between policy makers and the insurers on how to bridge
this gap.
6.3 Implications for policy makers
In the introduction we discussed the public-private part-
nership for cyber insurance. One insurance contribution
to the partnership is to ’promote established risk man-
agement standards’, with the UK policy document naming
ISO 27000 [48]. Our results provide some evidence veri-
fying the adoption of ISO 27000. For instance, no section
of ISO/IEC 27002 is entirely unaddressed. However, the
results show that there are controls contained in ISO/IEC
27002 and the CSC which are not covered in the forms.
This could be an issue for policy makers and we discuss
potential reasons behind it.
One reason for the absence of ISO/IEC 27002 and CSC
controls could be that insurers are focused on best prac-
tice from other lines of insurance. For example, 15 of the
forms mention a business continuity plan, which does
not form part of the CIS Security Controls framework.
Note that this is an important control for mitigating the
losses that would fall under business interruption cover-
age, which is traditionally offered by insurers.
Another reason could be that insurance contracts tend
to only last a year. Consequently, the insurer has a financial
incentive to prioritise controls that will have an immediate
effect. Such controls include security products, maintain-
ing back-ups and encrypting sensitive data. However, for
some controls and procedures the length of time they have
been in place becomes an important factor. For example,
appointing a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)
will have little immediate affect but will pay off in the long
term as changes in the structure of the organisation are
being realised at a much later stage. This is also true for
secure software engineering practices where the current
policy is less important than the policy in place when the
system was developed. Insurers are incentivised to focus
on controls with an immediate effect.
Another factor to consider is that insurers may focus
on the risks they are liable for as they do not cover all of
the cyber risks that an organisation might face. Table 1,
which details the range of coverage available, does not
include reputation damage or intellectual property theft.
For example, controls relating to data encryption or a
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functioning back up system, which mitigate the risk of
data breach and data corruption respectively, scored very
highly. Meanwhile, controlling administrative privileges
was not mentioned, despite it comprising a whole Section
of the CSC. One reason could be that it does not directly
mitigate a risk the insurers are liable for.
A rational insurer is concerned with the controls which
directly mitigate the risks that they are liable for, creat-
ing a question of misaligned incentives. In the literature,
the insurer is assumed to be the victim of moral hazard.
We suggest that where an applicant expects the insurer to
manage their cyber risk exposure, the presence of gaps in
coverage can lead the insurer to select security controls
which expose the insured party to risks not covered by
the policy. Such a case is an example of moral hazard in
which the insured party is the victim and the insurer is the
“guilty” party.
7 Conclusion and future work
We analysed 24 self-assessed proposal forms offered
by UK and US insurers, using themes from two
established information security frameworks. The
analysis reveals that self-assessed proposal forms
predominantly focus on a small range of controls
related to malware defences, managing back-ups and
use of encryption. Our results can inform the con-
scious evolution of the insurance application process.
In particular, future proposal forms could include con-
trols such as managing secure configuration, keeping an
inventory of hardware and software, control of adminis-
trative privileges and application security. It is important
to be conscious of the burden on the applicant, who must
complete the proposal form.
Given insurer’s understanding of risks, we suggest that
our results could help inform organisation’s security deci-
sions. However, as insurers only ask for security controls
which directly mitigate the risks that they bear finan-
cial responsibility for, misplaced incentives could lead to
poor security decisions. It is important for organisations
to bear these considerations in mind when purchasing
cyber insurance and making investment decisions once
insurance policies are purchased.
These incentives should be considered by policy mak-
ers given that they are not necessarily aligned with
the public interest. Anderson et al. illustrate how mis-
aligned incentives explain many security failures [20].
Forward thinking policy makers could anticipate mis-
aligned incentives in the cyber insurance domain and try
to correct these ahead of time to avoid failures in security.
Further, our results support the assumption that cyber
insurance will promote established risk management
standards, particularly ISO/IEC 27002. This assumption
requires further research as we have only looked at one
part of the application process.
To our knowledge, this is the first systematic analysis
of cyber insurance proposal forms. Consequently, there
are many novel directions for the study of proposal forms.
Our methodology is rooted in the themes provided by
two information security frameworks. Yet cyber insurance
covers areas distinct from information security. It would
be interesting to see an analysis of the controls in place to
mitigate Multi-Media Liability (outlined in Table 1) such
as review by a qualified attorney. Especially in light of
the different nature of risks such as international cyber
torts [38]. Future work could use an inductive approach
to capture controls not included in our analysis. Another
direction could involve usability studies to investigate the
trade offs between information collected and ease of the
application process.
Proposal forms are but one piece of the puzzle. In future
work we hope to interview key actors in the insurance
industry to better understand how the telephone inter-
views and on-site audits fit into the rest of the insurance
process. These interviews could also investigate why the
controls that we have identified are lacking in their pro-
posal forms. Further research could shed light upon the
motivation of the insurance market for requesting infor-
mation on certain controls. The relative importance of
factors such as the nature of the claims made from insured
organisations, the regulatory fines paid, the proposed leg-
islation regarding security practices, the evolution of the
threat intelligence community and the advices provided
by security industry is still unclear and subject to further
research.
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